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The Arab Spring presented the Gulf 
Cooperation Council (GCC) states with a 
stark choice about their social contracts, 
particularly with regard to their economic 
development ambitions. On one hand, a 
Western model combining economic and 
political liberalization has historically 
dominated the discourse on potential 
avenues for reform, especially on the heels 
of popular demands for democratization 
throughout the Middle East and North Africa 
(MENA) region since 2011. On the other 
hand, the Chinese model of authoritarian 
developmentalism may be a more 
appealing mechanism for future political 
and economic development to many in the 
Gulf states—especially the political elites. 
Even though the United States has long 
maintained a dominant presence in the 
Gulf, is the Chinese social contract model 
actually more applicable to the social and 
economic dynamics of GCC states than the 
Western orthodoxy of political liberalism and 
unbridled free market policies? If China’s 
unique development model can inspire 
GCC countries, what conditions of the GCC 
context make it a feasible model?
 The dominance of the U.S. in the global 
order after the Cold War left the Western 
model of development—characterized 
by free markets and democratization—as 
the preeminent path toward economic 
prosperity, and the Gulf has long remained 
a bastion of American hegemony in the 
Middle East. The interests that bind GCC 
states and the West are not based on 
shared values of liberalism, however, but 
rather on common economic goals. In 
contrast to Western social contracts in 
which state legitimacy is based on popular 
sovereignty, typically expressed through 
electoral politics, both the Chinese and GCC 
social contracts are predicated on economic 
quasi-guarantees. Since 1989, the 
legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party 
has been staked on delivering consistent 
economic growth. Given that all GCC states 
accrue the majority of their income through 
oil revenues, they represent “the example 
par excellence” (emphasis in original) of 
the rentier model.1 
 With growing links to the global 
economic system, and especially considering 
the increased use of information and 
communication technologies since the 
mid-1990s, GCC states considered political 
reform a necessity for placating both an 
increasingly globally minded population 
and external economic pressures as 
their interactions with Western countries 
increased.2 Conditions were favorable for 
a gradual move toward political liberalism 
in GCC countries, especially after the 
end of the Cold War. The creation of 
the Majlis al-Watani in the early 2000s 
facilitated Bahrain’s implementation of 
a representative parliamentary process 
that included opposition groups, making 
it a successful case of partial political 
liberalization (or, at the very least, political 
decompression) in the Gulf.3 Yet since the 
Arab Spring, GCC regimes have moved 
in the opposite direction, delaying the 
implementation of liberalizing reforms. The 
fall of multiple leaders in the MENA region 
posed an existential threat to the ruling 
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less concerned with utilizing economic 
policies as a means to establish social 
stability. Prioritizing economic growth over 
the implementation of political reform, the 
Chinese model is a proven mechanism 
for a ruling class to retain political control 
while fundamentally reshaping a country’s 
economic character. The opportunity to 
reap economic and diplomatic rewards 
while retaining an authoritarian status quo is 
particularly attractive to regimes wary of the 
implications of political liberalization, such 
as the GCC states. Ali Shihabi, founder of 
the Arabia Foundation, whose views reflect 
the ambitions of the Saudi state, directly 
referenced the attraction and utility of the 
Chinese model on the 29th anniversary 
of the suppression of the Tiananmen 
Square movement, opining: “Yes, they 
lost freedoms but gained a better life of 
prosperity, education, medical care, security, 
etc. What is better?”5
 Finally, the Chinese model is far less 
explicitly prescriptive compared to the 
Western model. Officials can tailor and 
experiment with its implementation, taking 
local political and economic conditions 
into consideration. Under Prime Minister 
Lee Kuan Yew, Singapore aggressively 
promoted foreign investment in order to 
take advantage of its strategic location 
in Southeast Asia,6 for example, whereas 
China utilized its massive population to 
transform itself into a manufacturing hub. 
While the precise mechanism is different, 
both approaches shared the same goal 
of economic development and deeper 
integration into the global economy. 
 Differences exist between the Chinese 
context of development and modern GCC 
countries, the most notable of which is the 
size of their relative populations. GCC states 
have substantially fewer residents than 
China, whose immensely large population 
served as a source of low-cost labor and 
provided China a competitive advantage 
in the global market. Therefore, the 
comparative advantage GCC states must 
employ to gain an economic edge in the 
global marketplace should differ.
 A jump in global oil demand post-2000 
(primarily driven by increasing Chinese 
manufacturing) bestowed windfall profits for 
elites; their very existence was at stake. As a 
countermeasure, GCC regimes doubled down 
on both their authoritarian tendencies and 
their ability to offer economic incentives. 
Saudi Arabia increased salaries and 
benefits for public employees, the United 
Arab Emirates introduced social welfare 
redistribution, and other states simply 
handed out cash incentives and increased 
the size of their already bloated public 
sectors. The most powerful demonstration 
of the GCC’s commitment to maintaining 
the political status quo, however, was the 
2011 Peninsula Shield Force intervention 
in Bahrain, which firmly cemented the 
impossibility of nonviolent revolution  
within the bloc.
 While it is easy to dismiss these post-
2011 developments, made in response 
to public pressure, as politically and 
economically counterproductive in the 
long term, is there a comparable precedent 
that has actually been successful in 
implementing similar initiatives to shore up 
social and political stability? The Chinese 
model of development (alternatively 
known as the “Beijing Consensus”) features 
certain qualities that offer particular appeal 
to authoritarian states. Suisheng Zhao, 
professor of Chinese politics, defines the 
model as a “non-ideological, pragmatic, 
and experimental approach to spur both 
social stability and economic growth while 
not compromising the party’s authority to 
rule.”4 Borne in the aftermath of the 1989 
Tiananmen protest movement, the impetus 
for its development was to placate popular 
demands for political reform by providing 
economic opportunities. In practice, it has 
proven remarkably successful at promoting 
social stability, with no imminent existential 
threat to the rule of the Communist Party 
developing in the decades since the 
Tiananmen movement.
 Simultaneously, China’s economic 
strategy has integrated the country as one 
of the major actors in the global economic 
system. The Chinese model should not 
be considered a direct competitor to the 
Washington Consensus, as the former 
encompasses an emphasis on social stability 
as well as an economic framework. The 
Washington Consensus, comparatively, is 
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GCC states, especially after 2003. Although 
current account balances have decreased 
in recent years as oil prices have again 
dropped, GCC states still possess sufficient 
capital surpluses to effectively underwrite 
sociopolitical stability in the medium term. 
Qatar, for example, maintains 203 percent 
of its GDP in net financial assets controlled 
by the government, and Saudi Arabia holds 
104 percent of GDP in similar assets.7 These 
funds can be manipulated unilaterally 
without resorting to direct taxation, lowering 
the expense of political capital typically 
necessary for structural overhauls. During 
the pre-2011 period in which oil rents were 
plentiful and political threats were minimal, 
there was no obvious need to reform the 
economic structures in the region. Now, 
the sheer amount of capital that GCC states 
have at their disposal may be sufficient in 
enabling fundamental economic reform 
in lieu of the unique high-control, high-
population context in which the Chinese 
economy grew.
 The availability of energy rents provides 
GCC states with the economic resources 
needed to launch major development 
programs and investments, though different 
GCC states have benefited disproportionately 
from natural resource endowments. As 
global energy consumption slowly transitions 
away from dependence on fossil fuels, 
economic diversification into alternative 
sectors has become a growing concern 
for Gulf countries.8 The post-2014 global 
oil collapse in which prices dropped from 
$105 to below $40 per barrel before slowly 
recovering has only increased pressure on 
Gulf monarchies in this regard. While GCC 
states still maintain high levels of foreign 
reserves to support current spending levels, 
without a new source of state revenue, the 
generosity of the rentier state cannot be 
maintained indefinitely. Though this is not an 
immediate concern, a future requirement to 
begin extracting revenue from the population 
through taxation rather than unearned 
resource rents is the single-most prominent 
factor that will force a renegotiation of the 
existing social contract.
 Politically, for the Gulf states, the 
China model provides a renewed basis of 
legitimacy. Post-2011, opposition sentiment 
driven by the Arab Spring posed a direct 
threat to the traditional claims to legitimacy 
GCC monarchies enjoyed—namely historical 
tradition and rent distribution. Sustained, 
balanced economic development shifts 
the basis on which regimes are evaluated 
by their citizens; by establishing economic 
prosperity and increased opportunities as 
the rationale for continuing the status quo, a 
regime can establish a revised social contract 
and preclude substantial changes to the 
political structure.
 Since 2011, political currents have pushed 
the GCC states to revisit their contracts 
with their respective populations. In many 
cases, the result has been retrenched 
authoritarianism instead of increased political 
openness. For example, al-Wefaq, Bahrain’s 
largest political opposition group, has been 
banned in Bahrain, while the Saudi monarchy 
has substantially centralized power in the 
hands of Crown Prince Mohammed bin 
Salman. Likewise, the potential threat to 
regime stability precludes the likelihood 
of most, if not all, political rulers adopting 
reformist agendas, staving off the only 
avenue for a peaceful transition toward 
inclusive politics in the region. The ultimate 
goals of opposition protesters in the 
Middle East, which included the overthrow 
of governments in Libya, Egypt, Yemen, 
and more, left little room for political 
compromise. Therefore, GCC states were 
relatively united in their goal to suppress 
domestic manifestations of the Arab Spring. 
Kuwait, with its comparatively representative 
parliament and limited perception of threat 
toward protesters, represents the exception 
to this rule. The legislature remains intact 
at the pleasure of the emir, who ultimately 
maintains elite control over any political 
reform process.
 Unwilling to pursue substantive 
political reforms, Gulf regimes provided 
alternative concessions, mainly in the 
form of short-term financial inducements 
like raising state employees’ salaries, to 
placate immediate grievances.9 However, 
the simultaneous emergence of large-scale 
protest movements with extensive demands 
in Saudi Arabia, Oman, and especially 
Bahrain accentuated the need to review the 
social contracts between the ruling class 
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and citizens; all states affected by the Arab 
Spring encountered this same dilemma. 
 Saudi Arabia effectively tends to combine 
economic reform policy and financial 
inducements with political consolidation, 
with the impact reaching even members 
of the royal family.10 In the public sphere, 
the new anti-terror law decreed in 2013 
potentially criminalizes political speech.11 
These restrictive and exclusionary policies 
were accompanied by an inclusive economic 
policy: the Vision 2030 campaign, which 
aims to spur economic development and 
diversify the economy, ambitiously seeking 
to reform the fundamental structure of the 
Saudi economy through foreign investment. 
The campaign seeks to reduce unemployment 
and increase the role of the private sector in 
economic development. Ultimately, a core 
motivation for the campaign is to provide 
Saudis with opportunities to become more 
deeply embedded in the global economy. 
The Vision 2030 plan explicitly mentions the 
desire to increase foreign direct investment 
and strengthen Saudi Arabia’s position on the 
Global Competitiveness Index.12 Despite not 
being designed with the intention of following 
a Chinese model of reform, this combination 
of authoritarian entrenchment and intensive 
integration into the global economy, 
especially in the wake of a major protest 
movement, has much in common with the 
Chinese model after 1989.
 The canonical cases of development 
that define both the Western model and the 
Chinese model rely upon contextual factors 
that are alien to the GCC; neither will be 
merely copied directly. The former, however, 
rests upon a belief that political liberalism is 
a necessary companion for global economic 
integration, while the latter provides a 
potent rationale for prioritizing economic 
development at the expense of political 
liberalization. Given the immense obstacles 
to the institution of political reform in the 
GCC, especially after 2011, a localized version 
of the Chinese model has preferable traits, 
given its proven track record in maintaining 
social stability under an economic-oriented 
social contract. Combined with neoliberal 
economic influences from the West that 
have driven campaigns like Vision 2030 in 
Saudi Arabia, a symbiotic combination of the 
two models that complements the unique 
context of the Arab Gulf may be emerging. 
The pressures on Gulf monarchies demand a 
revised social contract; including elements 
of the Chinese model of development is 
a potential route to ameliorate current 
deficiencies that affect social stability. This 
would allow the regimes to regain legitimacy 
on a new footing, while the population 
would enjoy novel economic opportunities.
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